This paper analyzes changes in the regulatory
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New Regulations for Securitizations and Asset-Backed Securities Sharon Brown-Hruska, Georgi Tsvetkov, and Trevor Wagener After reading this chapter you will understand:
• The challenges asset-backed securities faced in the financial crisis of 2007-9;
• The Dodd-Frank Act's provisions authorizing new regulations of asset-backed securities and securitizations;
• The changes that SEC's Regulation AB-II made to rules governing the offering process, disclosure, and reporting for asset-backed securities;
• Credit Risk Retention Rule (i.e., "skin in the game") requirements for securitizations;
• Volcker Rule requirements targeting proprietary trading and exemptions preserving the securitization process; and
• Emerging rules governing credit derivatives on mortgage-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations, and synthetic collateralized debt obligations.
The financial crisis of 2007-9 revealed problems with underwriting standards in mortgage markets that spread to the mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and asset-backed securities (ABS) markets more broadly. In 2010, the US Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), which contained express provisions that sought to increase transparency in the market for securitized assets and to better align the incentives facing different classes of market participants. The resulting rulemaking extended beyond the securitization and offering process for the issuance of ABS, creating requirements for ongoing disclosures, some applying to ABS issuers, 1 and others to the credit rating agencies that periodically assess the credit quality of ABS and other fixed income assets. Other structured products, including collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) on MBS and ABS indices whose performance was based on pools of mortgages or other assets, credit derivatives, and broader classes of securities-based swaps and financial assets, were subjected to new requirements for posting margin, collateral, and clearing aimed at reducing contagion and systemic risk that characterized the crisis.
Challenges in the Asset-Backed Securities Markets in the Financial Crisis
Asset-backed securities are financial products created by the process of securitization, which consists of bundling loans into asset pools and then issuing securities backed by the cash flows of the pools of underlying loans. 2 During the 2007-9 financial crisis, mortgage-backed securities, or more specifically, residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), the subset of ABS collateralized by residential mortgages, and in particular those based on loans made to subprime borrowers, performed poorly. This led policymakers and financial publications to attribute substantial blame for the financial crisis to ABS markets and more broadly to securitization Throughout this chapter, examples may focus on MBS, but the processes, problems, and regulatory implications often also apply to the greater category of ABS.
Market Opaqueness and Reliance on Credit Ratings
The securitization process transforms individual loans into marketable securities in several distinct steps. For MBS, for example, banks, trusts, and other lenders act as originators and begin the process by underwriting, funding, and servicing a loan to a mortgagor. In the next step, many such loans, often backed by similar underlying collateral types (e.g., residential mortgages), are purchased from originators by an arranger who bundles the underlying loans together into a pool.
The arranger could be the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae, a federal agency) or one of the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs)-Freddie Mac and Fannie
Mae-but could also be a private company. The arranger then sells the pool to a bankruptcyremote special-purpose vehicle (SPV), which issues MBS backed by the SPV's pool of loans and sells them to investors. Nationally recognized statistical rating organizations (credit rating agencies) are engaged to issue credit ratings for the MBS, which are used to market the securities for sale. The securities are then purchased by pension funds, insurance companies, asset managers, or other investors.
9
At each step of the securitization process, the potential for information asymmetry arises, since the purchaser may not have as much information regarding the assets in question as the seller. Moreover, the final investor is typically several degrees removed from origination of the underlying loans, adding to the potential difficulty in collecting all data relevant for performing due diligence.
One potential solution to the information asymmetry problem inherent to the securitization process could be for each purchaser in the chain to conduct independent due diligence on the underlying assets. Since building customized valuation models is time-consuming, costly, and requires investment in both data and labor, 10 however, this solution could involve repeating costly analysis several times. Compounding the information asymmetry, markets often move quickly, creating effective due diligence time constraints that require investors to collect and analyze relevant data in a short amount of time.
Brown-Hruska and Satwah opine that the high cost of independent due diligence on loanlevel or asset-level information, market participants' increasing dependence on third-party sources, and the assumption that ABS assets were efficiently priced combined to create a kind of "Grossman-Stiglitz Paradox." 11 A Grossman-Stiglitz Paradox occurs when incentives to invest in acquiring information about assets diminish as market prices are assumed to generally contain all relevant information. While the securitization process expanded the lending capacity of banks and issuers by passing credit risk to investors, the structural opacity and the cost of performing customized due diligence led some agents in the securitization process to rely upon the due diligence of third-party financial intermediaries and credit rating agencies better positioned to perform it.
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Given the challenges in conducting due diligence on securities supported by the cash flows of a pool of loans with potentially varied risk characteristics such as borrower credit score, collateral geography, or loan-to-value ratio, the SEC created principles-based disclosure requirements for ABS by adopting Regulation AB and publishing the rule in the Federal Register in 2005. 13 These disclosure requirements set minimum transparency and asset quality thresholds for so-called "shelf offerings" of ABS, which allow issuers to sell securities to the public without a separate prospectus for each offering in order to facilitate quicker access to capital markets.
14 This effectively allowed "off-the-shelf" offerings, as long as credit rating agencies assigned an "investment grade" 15 rating to the ABS and less than 20% of the underlying asset pool consisted of delinquent assets.
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Regulation AB in some ways incentivized the reliance on the due diligence of third parties, namely the credit rating agencies, as credit ratings were written into the regulatory requirements.
Moreover, the SEC in 2010 opined that the shelf registration offering process in Regulation AB Brunnermeier argued that, in essence, market discipline was transitory because a large portion of the credit risk was quickly transferred and ultimately borne by other parties.
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In an efficiently operating market, incentives are aligned via a combination of actual and predicted market signals such as price moves and reputational effects. In ABS markets, however, the limited nature of information available to final investors and the existence of multiple third parties throughout the securitization process meant that potential reputational damage was likely to be diffused, reducing the alignment of incentives among parties in the securitization process and final investors.
The FCIC concluded that the consequences of misaligned incentives were borne out by looser lending standards, a product of reduced due diligence by originators making the initial loans, arrangers who provided the immediate demand for purchasing most such loans, and ultimate investors who purchased ABS backed by the cash flows from such loans. The FCIC Report stated that in the lead up to the financial crisis:
Lending standards collapsed, and there was a significant failure of accountability and responsibility throughout each level of the lending system. This included borrowers, mortgage brokers, appraisers, originators, securitizers, credit rating agencies, and investors, and ranged from corporate boardrooms to individuals.
Loans were often premised on ever-rising home prices and were made regardless of ability to pay. 
Valuation Challenges and Contagion
Once doubts about the health of the housing market and the performance of the underlying assets surfaced, MBS valuation challenges became more pronounced. The declining performance of MBS heretofore considered "safe," coupled with rating downgrades, created sudden and substantial uncertainty in markets. Some economists suggested that the lack of transparency in the primary ABS market, misaligned incentives among different parties in the securitization process, and the reliance on credit rating agencies contributed to uncertainty regarding the value of MBS securities, which led to a reduction in liquidity for a wide range of ABS and ABS-linked products, including CDOs collateralized by MBS and credit default swaps (CDS) written on
MBS.
23 This uncertainty-driven illiquidity in turn led to substantial declines in the prices for entire classes of products, including many well-performing MBS. As these assets formed a substantial portion of many financial firms' balance sheets, the price declines in entire classes of assets threatened the survival of many major firms. As the FCIC described the consequences:
Through 2007 and into 2008, as the rating agencies downgraded mortgage-backed securities and CDOs, and investors began to panic, market prices for these securities plunged. Both the direct losses as well as the marketwide contagion and panic that ensued would lead to the failure or near failure of many large financial firms across the system. In addition to such coordinated rulemaking, the SEC implemented ABS-specific disclosure and registration requirements via Regulation AB-II, which generally created underlying assetlevel disclosure requirements for ABS offerings and reporting in order to increase ABS market transparency to investors. Several of these new rules are covered in the following sections.
Regulation AB-II As briefly discussed above, in early 2005, the SEC published Regulation AB, which was intended to address the registration, disclosure, and reporting requirements for ABS. The principles-based set of disclosure items attempted to identify disclosure concepts and provide illustrative examples without creating detailed disclosure guides for each asset class. 35 In practice, however, this created substantial ambiguity as to what disclosures were required.
In principle, Regulation AB required that issuers disclose information including:
• A transaction summary and risk factors;
• Static pool information on a sponsor's prior securitized pools of the same asset type, including delinquencies, cumulative losses, and prepayments;
• Relevant details of the underlying asset pool;
• Significant obligors of pool assets;
• The structure of the ABS transaction; • Derivatives instruments, such as swaps, altering the payment characteristics of the cash flows from the issuing entity; and
• Credit ratings.
In practice, however, the SEC eventually concluded that the latitude granted to issuers in determining the materiality of required disclosures, as well as the ability to delay providing required disclosures until two business days after the first sale of securities in an ABS offering, combined to create a situation in which prospective investors may not have had access to all desired information to conduct independent due diligence, and may have lacked time to adequately review the ABS transaction. • Data regarding the payment streams related to particular assets underlying an ABS, such as contractual terms, scheduled payment amounts, basis for interest rate calculations, and how payment terms change over time, if applicable;
• Collateral-specific data, such as geographic location, property valuation data, and loanto-value ratio;
• Performance data for each asset, such as information about obligor payment timeliness, delinquency, or default;
• Loss mitigation data on efforts by the servicer to collect amounts past due and losses that may pass on to investors; • Income and employment status verification for obligors;
• Mortgage insurance coverage, if relevant; and
• Lien position.
Such information was deemed important for facilitating independent investor due diligence, and consequently had to be included in the offering prospectus and in ongoing reports.
Asset-level data requirements apply to ABS collateralized by residential and commercial mortgages, auto loans and leases, debt securities, and resecuritizations of those asset classes;
other classes of securitizations, such as those collateralized by consumer debts and student loans, were exempted from these requirements as regulators decided that the compliance costs to provide asset-level data would exceed benefits to investors. that any third-party due diligence reports, such as those of credit rating agencies, be filed at least five days prior to the first sale of ABS in the offering, in order to give investors more time to engage in their own due diligence;
• Removing the previous "investment grade" credit rating requirement;
• Requiring that the chief executive officer of the depositor certify the disclosure contained in the prospectus and the structure of the securitization at the time of each ABS offering;
• Requiring a provision in the ABS transaction agreement calling for the review of underlying assets for compliance with the representations and warranties upon the occurrence of specific trigger events;
• Requiring the inclusion of a dispute resolution provision in ABS transaction documents;
• Requiring disclosure of investor requests to communicate with other investors in the ABS; and
• Replacing the previous ABS shelf registration practice of filing a base prospectus and a later prospectus supplement for each takedown with the requirement that a single prospectus be filed for each takedown (though issuers have the option of instead filing a supplement to the preliminary prospectus highlighting material changes from the preliminary prospectus 48 hours prior to the first sale, subject to the Regulation AB-II asset-level disclosure requirements and timing requirements of both the initial prospectus and the supplements).
Notably, credit rating agency risk assessments are removed as a necessary criterion for shelf-offering eligibility. However, an SEC rule, published in the Federal Register in the same month as Regulation AB-II, recognized the common (and presumed continued) use of third-party due diligence services like credit rating agencies by ABS issuers. This rule, the Dodd-Frank Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations implementing regulation (NRSRO regulation), required that credit rating agencies publicly disclose findings and conclusions in a due diligence report made available to potential investors and any users of credit ratings at least five days prior to the first sale in the ABS offering, if this credit rating agency report is used in place of Form ABS-15G. 44 Form ABS-15G is generally required to be furnished by issuers at least two days prior to the first ABS sale, unless the issuer obtains a representation from a credit rating agency that it will publicly disclose its findings and conclusions; in this way the NRSRO regulation complements the Regulation AB-II disclosure requirements, which apply to issuers.
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There were also numerous detailed reporting requirements for ABS added as part of • 
Credit Risk Retention Rule
The enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act put a hold on the SEC's independent efforts to create a shelf eligibility requirement for ABS issuers, mandating that they retain an economic interest (i.e., "skin in the game") in each tranche of an ABS offering in order to better align the incentives of all participants in the securitization process with those of final investors in ABS. 52 Section 941 of the Dodd-Frank Act adds section 3(a)(77) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and defines the term "asset-backed security" as "a fixed-income or other security collateralized by any type of self-liquidating financial asset … that allows the holder of the security to receive payments that depend primarily on cash flow from the asset …."
53 Some of these exemptions, for example, apply to government-sponsored enterprises, commercial mortgage-backed security issuers, and asset-backed commercial paper conduits.
Standard Risk Retention
The Credit Risk Retention Rule's standard risk retention options-applicable to those offerings not eligible for exemptions or exceptions-were designed to be conceptually simple yet flexible.
They allowed ABS sponsors to structure their minimum 5% credit risk retention "vertically" via equal shares of each tranche, "horizontally" via a first-loss piece equivalent to 5% of fair value of the underlying assets, or via an "L-shaped" customized combination of both vertical and horizontal retentions. increased creditworthiness in the more senior tranches by absorbing the first 5% of losses. This might increase investor participation. However, pure horizontal residual interest retention does not necessarily align issuers' incentives with all investors' incentives, since substantial losses on the underlying asset pool could eliminate the issuers' retained interest without impacting senior tranche investors. In this scenario, the issuer is left with fewer ongoing incentives to ensure effective future servicing of underperforming assets. As public comments noted, if the servicer is affiliated with the issuer, it could also lead to incentives to prefer loss mitigation approaches that favor junior tranches, such as loan modification, over approaches that favor senior tranches, such as liquidation of the securitized asset pursuant to uncertainty reduction.
55
In order to better align issuer incentives with investor incentives, the rule requires that horizontal residual interest be measured by fair value rather than par value. This should tie the issuer's total economic exposure to the quality of the underlying pool of securitized assets. For low-quality asset pools, issuers would have to hold a larger residual tranche to meet the 5% fair value credit risk exposure requirement. For high-quality asset pools, the fair value of the residual tranche would be higher and issuers would be able to satisfy the requirement by holding a smaller residual interest.
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The rule also provides sponsors with the option of establishing an eligible horizontal cash reserve account in an amount equal to the fair value of a horizontal residual interest, in place of actually retaining a first-loss tranche. This reserve account would be used to satisfy payments on 55 79 FR 77602, "Credit Risk Retention" (December 24, 2014), pp. 77719-20. 56 The regulators concluded that Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) standards concerning fair value calculation methodologies were sufficient to prevent gaming of the requirement. • Each third-party purchaser must be unaffiliated with any party to the CMBS transaction, including other investors, the special servicer, or originators of less than 10% of the underlying assets;
• Each third-party purchaser must pay for their B-piece in cash, and may not finance the purchase from any other party to the CMBS transaction apart from other investors; and
• The purchase price paid by third-party purchasers for the B-pieces must be disclosed, so other investors can quantify the credit risk exposure of the B-piece buyers, and the resulting level of incentive alignment with other investors.
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper. Asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits are generally SPVs holding assets such as ABS, whose purchases thereof are financed by the issuance of commercial paper. Regulators recognized that if the ABS purchased by an ABCP conduit were issued with sponsors already retaining credit risk, then the Credit Risk Retention
Rule might effectively "double tax" ABCP conduits. In order to prevent such doubling of credit risk retention requirements, the rule created an exemption for ABCP conduits with 100% liquidity support from a regulated institution whose ABS interests were all purchased in initial issuances from sponsors who already retained credit risk per the rule. Other Exemption and Exception Criteria
In addition to the exemptions for GSE-sponsored issuances and the special risk retention options for broad asset classes, the rule also included specific exemptions for defined "qualifying" assets. • The underlying CRE assets must meet specific underwriting standards, such as amortization periods of 10-25 years for non-multifamily residential CRE loans or 10-30 years for multifamily residential CRE loans, and loan-to-value caps of 70% for first and junior loans and 65% for first-lien loans, with exceptions;
• The securitization transaction must be collateralized solely by CRE loans and servicing assets; and
• The securitization transaction must not permit reinvestment periods.
Other Criteria. Securitizations collateralized entirely by qualifying commercial loans are exempt from risk retention requirements; 69 likewise, auto loans meeting qualifying criteria are individually exempt from risk retention requirements if securitized.
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Blended Pools of Qualifying Assets. Sponsors may blend pools of qualifying automobile loans, qualifying commercial loans, or qualifying CRE loans with non-qualifying assets of the same class in order to receive up to a 50% reduction in the minimum required risk retention. The Volcker Rule prohibits banking entities from directly or indirectly acquiring or retaining an ownership interest in covered funds as principals; from sponsoring a covered fund, for instance by acting as a trustee, commodity pool operator (CPO), managing member, or general partner of a covered fund; or from being enabled to select the trustees, managers, or a majority of directors of a covered fund, subject to exemptions and exceptions. 75 "Wholly owned" means no more than 5% of the entity's ownership interests may be held by employees or directors of the banking entity or its affiliate, and no more than 0.5% of the entity's outstanding ownership may be held by a third party for the purpose of establishing corporate separateness or bankruptcy concerns, with the banking entity or its affiliate owning all other outstanding ownership interests (at least 94.5% of the wholly owned subsidiary As a result of the exemptions, the swaps pushout rule primarily applied to CDS indices such as ABX, uncleared CDS, many physical commodity swaps, total return swaps, and equity swaps.
It remained controversial due to concerns that pushing swaps into uninsured affiliates would create obstacles to the resolution of a bankruptcy or other wind-down of a complex financial company.
In December 2014, the swaps pushout rule was substantially weakened by the enactment of uncleared swaps. The proposed rule granted preferential treatment to cleared swaps and futures over uncleared swaps in the calculation of initial margin requirements, requiring a ten-day closeout assumption for uncleared swaps, versus a five-day closeout assumption for cleared swaps and a one-day closeout assumption for futures. 90 Public comments on the proposed rule noted that this longer closeout assumption will require counterparties for uncleared swaps to post additional initial margin, which usually must be held in assets with low expected returns likely below financial firms' cost of capital, imposing both opportunity costs and direct costs of carry.
Many comments on the proposed rule, such as the cost-benefit analysis by Brown-Hruska and Wagener, were critical of its potentially high costs and substantially preferential treatment for cleared swaps and futures relative to uncleared swaps. 91 As of May 2015, the regulators have yet to publish the final rules responding to public comments. If regulators adopt the proposed rule, the costs of some synthetic ABS and many common hedges for ABS may increase.
Rules Relating to Clearing and Disclosure
As the Dodd-Frank Act and related regulations pushed markets toward clearing swaps, regulations relating to clearing security-based swaps became increasingly important to the credit May 2015, limited to the period of government conservatorship of the relevant GSEs, a change in the conservatorship status of the GSEs may make credit risk concerns relevant to future agency MBS issuances, and thus lead to the elimination of these exemptions or further changes to the regulations governing MBS and related products.
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Key Points
• Regulators and policymakers identified a lack of pre-trade transparency, flawed and outsourced due diligence, and a failure to align sponsor and issuer incentives with investor incentives as major drivers of poor ABS performance in the financial crisis.
• Following the crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act, implementing regulations, and coordinated rulemaking by financial regulators began to reshape the market for ABS and related derivatives.
• The SEC's Regulation AB-II required asset-level disclosures by issuers, earlier disclosures in order to give investors more time to conduct independent due diligence, stricter criteria for shelf registration and offering eligibility, and a de-emphasis on the importance of credit ratings to discourage reliance on third-party valuations by ABS investors.
• The Credit Risk Retention Rule requires that most ABS issuers retain a 5% aggregate exposure to the credit risk of the assets collateralizing the ABS offering, via a vertical retention, horizontal residual retention, or a combination thereof.
• The Volcker Rule prohibited banking entities from engaging in proprietary trading or acquiring interests in, retaining interests in, or sponsoring covered funds such as hedge 93 79 FR 57184, "Asset-Backed Securities Disclosure and Registration" (September 24, 2014), p. 57193.
funds or private equity funds, with exceptions and exemptions for some traditional securitization structures, but not for resecuritizations or securitizations of derivatives.
• Derivatives regulations following the financial crisis included an expansive swaps pushout rule later statutorily amended to only force banking entities to push out securitybased swaps such as ABX, other CDS indices, and other structured finance credit derivatives into uninsured affiliated entities.
• New proposed margin and collateral requirements for uncleared swaps and a mandate to clear certain classes of CDS, such as untranched North American and European corporate CDS, may increase costs of some synthetic ABS and of common hedges for ABS.
• Regulators have yet to take final action on all rulemaking proposals, so the status of ABS and credit derivatives is still subject to change based on how regulators respond to public comments.
